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Many people today view the Internet as an integral part of everyday life. Online shopping, emailing friends, even filing electronic tax forms
demonstrate the Internet's growing influence in
transforming societal habits around the world. As
the Internet continues to break barriers in traditional notions of communication, disagreements
emerge on how best to regulate this developing
medium.' Indeed, some of the hot communications topics today (e.g., online privacy, copyright,
spam) 2 center on the debate between preserving
the Internet's unfettered nature and imposing
greater government oversight. 3 One of the most
challenging questions courts now face concerns
the Internet's exact legal definition. 4 Does it constitute a mere collection of wires and processors
or an actual, tangible location subject to tradi5
tional federal and state laws?
Noah v. AOL Time Warne,6 represents a good ex-

ample of this dilemma.

Here, a plaintiff at-

' See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (evaluating
the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act in the Internet setting); Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that §230 of
the Communications Decency Act granted AOL publisher
immunity from defamatory third party postings on its message boards).
2
See generally, Michael Totty, E-Commerce (A Special Report):
Taming the Frontier:The Internet Was Going to be a Place Without
Rules, Without Borders; A Place Where Anything Goes; Well, Guess

What?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at RIO (describing how
both the government and private sector are trying to regulate
commerce and protect consumers in the "freewheeling" Internet environment).
3 See Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1013 (Fla.
2001) (deciding whether the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 pre-empts Florida law in holding an Internet Service
Provider liable for distributing defamatory messages).
4 See e.g.,-United States v. Am. Library Ass'n Inc., 539 U.S.
194, 204-08 (2003) (describing the difficulty in applying either "traditional" or "designated" public forum analysis to Internet access in public libraries).
5 See Access Now Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F.

tempted to sue America Online ("AOL") for violating Title II of the Civil Rights Act ("Tide II") by
failing to remove hate messages in their Islamic
topic chat rooms. 7 The court ultimately rejected
this argument, 8 holding that chat rooms do not
constitute a physical "place of public accommodation under Title II."' 9 It also found that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (the "CDA")
gave Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), such as
AOL, "publisher" immunity from the potentially
libelous messages of its members. 10
Noah raises a fundamental issue of whether Internet chat rooms should "escape" federal regulation simply because of their non-physical characteristics. Some suggest that this serves as bad precedent, since laws like the Civil Rights Act enforce
against a particularly divisive social evil-racial
discrimination.' Others disagree with this interpretation and point to our nation's traditional
protection of free expression and the dangers of
Supp.2d 1312, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (discussing the question
of whether an Internet website could be defined as a "place
of public accommodation" under Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
6 261 F. Supp.2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003).
7 Id. at 535 ("Plaintiff alleges that although he reported
every one of the alleged violations to AOL, AOL refused to
exercise its power to eliminate the harassment in the 'Beliefs
Islam' and 'Koran' chat rooms.").
8
Id. at 537.
9 Id. at 545. ("Although a chat room may serve as a virtual forum through which AOL members can meet and converse in cyberspace, it is not an 'establishment' under the
plain meaning of that term as defined by the statute.") (emphasis in original).
10 Id. at 537-38 (holding that "while parties that post information in Internet forums remain accountable under all
applicable federal and state laws, they cannot be reached indirectly through the imposition of liability on the ISPs that
serve as intermediaries in posting the information.").
"
See id. at 539 n.5 (pointing to Mr. Noah's argument
that granting ISPs immunity from Civil Rights Laws is "bad
policy").
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imposing content discrimination to satisfy the
"views of the majority. '1 2 Finding the balance between these two competing arguments poses a difficult challenge, especially when applying this
problem to the metaphysical chat room environment.

13

This Note argues that the Noah opinion correctly refrained from applying Title II to the chat
room environment. Although chat rooms closely
resemble traditional Title II outlets of societal interaction, they still do not adequately fit into the
statutory definition of a physical "place of public
accommodation." 1

4

In addition, applying tradi-

tional Civil Rights laws in this particular case may
be inappropriate.1 5 Since Congress passed Title II
in a different place and time,1 6 lawmakers could
never account for the development of new, freely
accessible platforms like Internet chat rooms or
the1 7 subsequent legislation designed to protect
it.

More importantly, imposing hate speech censorship duties on ISPs raises freedom of speech
concerns, as chat rooms now represent a valuable
forum for the public exchange of ideas."' While
private ISPs are free to censor postings on their
own, 19 forcing them to do so through government
regulation may amount to an unconstitutional
20
form of content regulation.
Part I of this Note summarizes the relevant legal
history leading to Noah's decision and describes
the statutory interpretations applying to chat
rooms. Part II gives a brief overview of Noah v.
AOL Time Warner and the court's rationale for dis12 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-392
(1992) (holding that a facially overbroad hate speech ordinance could not overcome the First Amendment's provisions
simply because it enforced the majority's disapproval of racially discriminatory hate speech).
13 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 544-45 ("Although a chat
room or other online forum might be referred to metaphorically as a 'location' or 'place,' it lacks the physical presence
necessary to constitute a place of public accommodation
under Title II.").
14 See id. at 540-45 (discussing the statutory language and

subsequent case law, all requiring a "physical" facility for a
valid Title II claim).
15 See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding that Title II did not apply to mem-

bership organizations not associated with physical facilities
and that the statute was not designed to "regulate a wide
spectrum of consensual human relationships").
16 See David Hudson, AOL Wins in Chat Room Suit, 2
No.22 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2 (2003) (quoting Robert O'Neil,

Director of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection
of Free Expression, ". . . it is clear that 'in 1964, no one would
have thought of virtual places of public accommodation'").
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missing Noah's complaint. Part III provides an
analysis of the court's argument and demonstrates
how public accommodation law, the CDA, and
First Amendment principles all prevent Title II liability. Finally, Part IV concludes by offering both
predictions and possible solutions to the ongoing
debate.
I.

STATUTORY AND LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO NOAH

Understanding Noah v. AOL Time Warner requires a basic knowledge of the three main issues
presented in the case. Section A begins this overview by describing Title II of the Civil Rights Act
and the subsequent legal interpretations of a
"place of public accommodation." Section B analyzes the CDA and illustrates how its language
grants ISPs a broad liability loophole regarding
the online chat room postings produced by its
members. Finally, Section C examines the legal
history of hate speech and how the First Amendment affects the government's ability to censor
these statements.
A. Title II of the Civil Rights Act
In 1964, Congress passed Title II of the Civil
Rights Act, which attempted to stop the widespread practice of excluding African-Americans
from access to public areas. 21 Daniel v. Pau2 2 best
summarized Title II's purpose by recalling Congress's intent of "remov[ing] the daily affront and
17 See id; see also discussion infra Part III.B, which describes how the Internet's open accessibility to anyone with
Internet access tends to disprove the "discriminatory intent"
necessary for a valid Title II claim and how the CDA grants
ISPs immunity from suits dealing with third party postings.
18 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 540 (citing Zeran v. Am.
Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) by discussing the
CDA's role in balancing free speech with the enforcement of
federal laws); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
391 (1992) (holding a municipal "fighting words" ordinance
facially invalid since it served as an impermissible form of
content regulation).
19 See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 436, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that a private ISP
did not violate a plaintiff's free speech rights by restricting
their e-mails because ISPs were not State actors).
20 See discussion infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the
forced censorship of protected hate speech not meeting
Chaplinsky's "fighting words" test may be an inappropriate
form of government-sponsored content regulation).
21
42 U.S.C. §2000a (2000); see also H.R. REP. No. 88-914,
at 18 (1964).
22 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
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humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of
access to facilities ostensibly open to the general
public." 23 Consequently, courts have generally

adopted a broad view when interpreting the statute.

24

Title II consists of two primary parts: Section A,
which deals with its "equal access" provision and
Section B, which describes its "interstate commerce" requirement. 25 Section A defines "equal
access" as follows, "[A]ll persons shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation,
as defined in this section, without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." 26 Section B goes on further to state that "places of public accommodation," which include "lodgings; facilities princi-

pally engaged in selling food for consumption on
the premises; gasoline stations; [or] places of exhibition or entertainment," 27 must also "affect interstate commerce" to be covered by this section.
1)

28

A Physical "Placeof Public Accommodation"

What exactly is a "place of public accommodation?" Title II defines "place" within four specified categories: (1) "establishment[s] which
provid[e] lodging to transient guests," (2)
"facilit[ies] principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises," (3) "place is] of
Id. at 307-08 (quoting H.R. Rep No. 914, at 18).
See id. at 307 ("But it does not follow that the scope of
§[2000a] (b) (3) should be restricted to the primary objects of
Congress' concern when a natural reading of it language
would call for broader coverage.").
25
42 U.S.C. §2000a. The title of the section is "Prohibition against discrimination or segregation in places of public
accommodation."
26
Id. §2000a(a).
27
42 U.S.C. §2000a(b) (2000).
28
Id. §2000a(b)-(c) ("For purposes of this section, 'commerce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States.").
29
42 U.S.C. §2000a(b).
30
See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 542-43 (2003) (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am.., 993
F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993) and Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1994)) ("[T]o ignore this requirement is to ignore the plain language of the statute and to
render the list of example facilities provided by the statute
23
24

superfluous.").
31 Id.

32
See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Miller v.
Amusement Enter. Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968); United

exhibition or entertainment," or (4) the catch all
provision-"any establishment . ..which is physically located within the premises of any establishment" listed in this statute. 29 Despite this seemingly clear definition, courts remain split on
whether one can extend the definition of "place"
3
beyond the written word. y1
One such disagreement concerns the "physical"
aspect of the term "place of public accommodation." 3' The majority of Title II cases have dealt
with the denial of access to actual physical
places.3 2 Nevertheless, some plaintiffs have tried
to impose Title II jurisdiction on non-physical
places (e.g., membership organizations) by relying on a broader interpretation of the statutory
language.3 3 Perhaps the most recent examples of
these attempts were the Title II cases against the
Boys Scouts of America for its stringent member34
ship policy.
In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America and Boys Scouts of
America v. Dale, the plaintiffs alleged that the Boy
Scouts violated Title II by denying them member36
ship based on religion 35 and sexual preference.
Both sought to define the Boy Scouts membership
organization as a "place of public accommodation" by claiming that a broad reading of "place of
exhibition or entertainment" included the group
37
within Title II.
"'[T]he fact that [the Boy
Scouts] offer entertainment to the public at various locations, all of which are 'places,'. . . subjects
them to the strictures of Title I' "38 The court in
Welsh rejected this argument, holding that the
States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1993).
33 See, e.g., Welsh, 993 F.2d 1267; Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). In these two cases, the plaintiffs
tried to equate the Boy Scouts with a "place of public accommodation" simply because the organization met in public
places. Welsh, 993 F.2d 1267; Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000).
34 Both plaintiffs were denied membership for failing to
satisfy the Boy Scout's membership policy. Welsh, 993 F.2d
1267; Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
35
Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1268 ("[Plaintiff] Elliott Welsh and
his seven year-old [sic] son Mark have brought suit asking the
United States Courts to force the Boy Scouts of America to
accept Mark as a member despite the fact that he refuses to
comply with its Constitution and By-laws and affirm his belief
in God.").
36
Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 ("Respondent is James Dale, a
former Eagle Scout whose adult membership [as a Scoutmaster] in the Boy Scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts
learned that he is an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.").
37 Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1268-69; Dale, 530 U.S. at 645.
38
Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269 (citing Appellants' brief).
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definition of "place" must be drawn from the statute's enumerated categories. 39 As such, the court
noted that Title II mostly referenced physical facilities and did not include membership organizations, like the Boy Scouts, within its definition of
"places of public accommodation." 40

The majority in Welsh found that equating a
membership organization with a "place of public
accommodation" required "a close connection to
a particular facility." 4 1 The court reasoned that
only Congress had the authority to alter the statute's literal meaning with the plaintiff's expansive
view. 4 2 The majority further noted that a broad
Title II interpretation only applied to situations
43
involving "denial of access to public facilities."
Since the Boy Scouts were never tied to one particular physical facility, they could not be44considered a "place of public accommodation."
In Dale, the Supreme Court briefly touched
upon the "physicality" requirement of a "place of
public

accommodation." 45

Although

Dale ad-

dressed a different law and issue (a New Jersey
public accommodation statute and freedom of association) than Welsh (Title II and religious discrimination), the Court nonetheless criticized the
New Jersey Supreme Court for not linking a nonphysical membership organization to "[a] place of
public accommodation." 46 The Court noted that
many Federal Circuit decisions like Welsh appeared to mandate a physical facility requirement
in Title II cases.4 7 Thus, the majority found the
state court's broader reading of "place of public
Id. ("The clear language of the statute mandates a different conclusion, for we must always be cognizant of the fact
that 'the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used."' (quoting Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))).
40
Id.
Id. at 1275.
41
Id. at 1271 ("Only after Congress has had the opportu42
nity for deliberation and reflection should a radical change
of the nature the plaintiffs propose be enacted.").
43 Id. at 1270 ("It is only in this context-denial of access
to public facilities-that courts must interpret Title II
broadly." (citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08
(1969))).
44 Id. at 1272.
45
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(holding that a New Jersey public accommodation law violated the First Amendment rights of the Boy Scouts by forcing the organization to admit a gay Scoutmaster).
Id. at 657.
46
47 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 542, n.7 (2003) (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 657, n.3).
Id. (illustrating that both Dale and Noah find that the
48
New Jersey decision represents the only case linking a mem39

accommodation" was the exception to the
norm. 48
The Ninth Circuit in Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network also agreed with Welsh's reasoning. 49 The appellate court held that a Cult Awareness group
did not constitute a "place of public accommodation" because defining a membership organization as such would "obfuscate the term 'place'
and render nugatory the examples Congress pro' 50
vides to illuminate the meaning of that term.
Although the Cult Awareness Network offered the
public a variety of goods and services (i.e., pamphlets and social awareness), the membership organization was not tied to any physical facility such
51
as a restaurant, recreational facility, or theater.
Since the defendant association never denied the
plaintiff access to a physical establishment, the
Clegg court found that Title II never applied to the
52
plaintiffs discrimination case.
Despite the abundance of decisions that followed Welsh and Clegg's reasoning, some Circuits
endorsed a broader interpretation of "place of
public accommodation. "' 53 This mainly occurred

in public accommodation cases dealing with the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 54 Although a different statute, Title III of the ADA has
an "equal access" anti-discrimination provision almost identical to Title J.55 More notably however,
the ADA has a more expansive list of "places or
public accommodation," with twelve categories as
opposed to Title II's four. 56 This includes Title

II's specified locations (lodgings, restaurants, and
bership organization like the Boy Scouts to a "place of public
accommodation").
49 18 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1994).
50

Id. at 755.

Id. at 756 ("These facts are insufficient to establish
that the goods or services are sold, purchased, performed, or
engaged in from any public facility or establishment.").
Id. ("The facilities where the [group's meetings] take
52
place no doubt are 'places,' but Clegg fails to allege that Cult
Awareness has any connection to a particularplace of public
accommodation.").
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 543 (citing plaintiff's reli53
ance on the First Circuit decision in Carparts Distribution
Ctr. Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass'n. of New England Inc.).
51

54

Id.

42 U.S.C. §12182(a) (2000) ("No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
55

equal enjoyment .

.

. of any place of public accommodation

Id. at §12181(7) (F); see also Carparts Distribution Ctr.
56
Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass'n. of New England Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Sierra Club v. Lawson, 2. F.3d
462, 467 (1993)).
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theaters) along with other facilities such as retail
57
stores, transportation centers, and zoos.
In Carparts Distribution Ctr. Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesalers Assoc. of New England Inc.,58 the First
Circuit held that "places of public accommodation" are not limited to "actual physical structures." The court found the ADA definition of
"place of public accommodation" ambiguous,
focusing particularly on the inclusion of "travel service" within the statute and noting that the term
could either represent an actual travel agency or a
non-physical toll-free telephone travel "club." 60
The court further concluded that the ADA's
"broad sweep" supported a comprehensive breakdown of any barriers to a disabled person 6' and
that imposing a restrictive view would "severely
frustrate Congress's intent" with the ADA. 62 Thus,
the lack of "physical boundaries or physical entry"
to the ADA's Title III public accommodation definition permits a finding that a trade association,
which administers an employee insurance plan,
could qualify as a "place" despite its non-physical
63
nature.
Like the First Circuit, the Seventh Circuit in Doe
v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 6 4 appeared to
endorse the idea of a broader "place of public accommodation" definition. 65 In fact, it seemed to
extend its provisions significantly beyond the
physical world. 66 In holding a health insurance
57

42 U.S.C §12181 (7) (F); see also CarpartsDistributionCtr.

Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
58 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
59
Id. at 19 ("This ambiguity, considered together with
agency regulations and public policy concerns, persuades us
that the phrase is not limited to actual physical structures.")
(emphasis added).
60
Id. ("It would be irrational to conclude that persons
who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the
ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the
telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended such an absurd result.").
61 Jd. (citing 42 U.S.C. §12101(b) (2000) and the Congressional legislative history in H.R.Rep. No. 485, pt.2, at 99
(1990)).
62
Id. at 20 (arguing that Congress did not set a limit to
physical facilities when passing the ADA and that doing so
would contradict its intention to open up all facilities to disabled people).
63
See id. Although the Court did not decide whether the
defendant's insurance plan was in fact a "place of public accommodation," it found that the district court could not dismiss plaintiffs claim simply because the plan was a "non
physical" entity. Id.
64
179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
65
Id. at 564-65.
66

See id. at 559 (citing Carpartsand broadening its public

accommodation definition to the electronic world).

policy subject to the ADA's Title III, the court in
Mutual of Omaha found that the statute extended
not only to "hotel[s], restaurant[s], [and] dentist's office[s]" but also to "website[s], or [any]
other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space). 6 7 Thus, the ruling would seem to
suggest that any Internet product, whether a website or even a chat room, could be considered a
"place of public accommodation. "' 6
8
However, some ADA courts rejected Mutual of
Omaha's broader definition, and similar to the Title II cases focused on the physical aspect of a
"place of public accommodation." 69 In Access
Now
Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.,70 the court held that
Southwest's ticketing website did not violate Title
III, even though it was not fully accessible to blind
people. 7' The court relied on the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Rendon v. Valleycrest Prod. Ltd. ,72
which stated that for the ADA to apply, a "nexus"
must exist "between the challenged service and
' 73
the premises of the public accommodation. "
Thus, since the Southwest website was not a physical location, no tangible relationship existed that
could link Title III's "equal access" requirement
74
with the plaintiff's discrimination allegation.
2)

A "Place of Public Exhibition or Entertainment"
Besides the "physicality" issue, courts also split

67

Id.

See id.; see also Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F.
Supp.2d 532, 544 n.Il (E.D. Va. 2003) (emphasizing Mutual
of Omaha's use of "web site" and "electronic space").
69
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 543-44 (pointing to ADA
cases requiring a physical facility: Parker v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000).
70
227 F. Supp.2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
71
Id. at 1321 ("[T]he Internet website at issue here is
neither a physical, public accommodation itself as defined by
the ADA, nor a means to accessing a concrete space such as
the specific television studio in Rendon"); see also Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 544.
72
294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
"Who Wants to Be a Millionaire" game show violated Title III
by not making their telephone screening game accessible to
the deaf). The court found a Title III "nexus" between the
telephone service and a physical facility because the telephone device served as a necessary conduict for participants
to enter the television studio. Id.
73
Access Now Inc., 227 F. Supp.2d at 1321 (quoting
Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284 n.8).
74 Id. ("Thus, because the Internet website, southwest.
com, does not exist in any particular geographic location,
Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that Southwest's website
impedes their access to a specific, physical, concrete space
such as a particular airline ticket counter or travel agency.").
68
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on what exactly constitutes a "place of public exhibition or entertainment" within Title

75
11.

The

statute defines a "place of entertainment" as one
which "affects interstate commerce" by "customarily present[ing] films, performances, athletic
teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce. '7 6 Examples include a "motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhior entertainment." 7 7

bition

Despite

the

lan-

guage's apparent plain meaning, many courts see
the wording as "obscure" and tend to adopt 7 8a
broad meaning of the term "entertainment.

Thus, courts not only include movie houses, but
also swimming pools 79 and snack bars in recrea80
tional parks.
In Daniel v. Paul, the Supreme Court extended
Tide II's "entertainment" interpretation to include both direct and indirect forms of entertainment.8 1 Not only did Title II apply when the establishment's customers were "spectators," it also applied to situations where customers provided the
entertainment through utilization of the establishment's facilities, such as access to a lake or snack
facilities.8 2 Thus, anytime a "place of public accommodation" either offers the entertainment or
provides the means of entertainment, it will be
subject to Title II's anti-discriminatory access pro83

visions.

8 4 took
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Baird
Daniel's holding a step further. The court found

Compare United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a retail convenience store was a "place of
entertainment" due to the presence of a video games within
the store's premises) with Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993
F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Boy Scouts of
75

America membership organization could not be a "place of
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that a 7-Eleven retail convenience store, which by
itself may not qualify as a Title II establishment,
became a "place of entertainment" by merely possessing two video arcade games within its premises.8 5 Since "people play video games to amuse

themselves," their presence within the 7-Eleven
automatically brought a Title II obligation to the
store's owners.8 6 The court stated that it did not
matter whether the video games constituted a "pe87
ripheral" component of the store's activities.
Any "entertainment" aspect within a public facility
would come under Title II since the statute's goal
of providing "equal access" would be frustrated
otherwise.88 However, even this expansive view
has some limitations.
In Halton v. Great Clips Inc.,8 9 an Ohio district
court held that a hair salon was not subject to Title II's provisions despite being located in a shopping center. 90 Even though Title II "covered" establishments (restaurants) surrounded the hair
salon, the court did not feel justified in extending
Title II liability for actions beyond the salon
owner's control. 9 1 Although the hair salon's owners decided to locate in a shopping mall, they
could not influence who the other tenants would
be (i.e., "recreational" establishments). 92 Despite
the legal precedent of broadly reading "entertainment," the court found no "entertainment" activities within the hair salon, reasoning that Congress
could have easily amended "public accommoda93
tion" to include retail stores within the statute.
ute's language supports this broader notion).
85 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 1996).
84
85 Id. at 453-54 (demonstrating that the presence of
video arcade machines made the 7-Eleven store a "place of
entertainment").
86 Id.

entertainment" since they were not connected to any physical
facilities).

87
Id. at 454 (arguing that 7-Eleven's "place of entertainment" linkage comes under §2000a(b) (4) not (b) (2), which

42 U.S.C. §2000a(c) (2000).
Id. at §2000a(b)(3).
78 See Miller v. Amusement Enter. Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th
Cir. 1968) (holding that an amusement park fit into Title II's
"place of public accommodation").
79 See United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 F.2d

only required proximity to a covered establishment).

76

77

83 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a club's swimming pool affected interstate commerce by providing recreational access
to out of state members).
80 See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
81 See id. at 305-06 (interpreting a broad intent when
Congress defined a "place of entertainment").
Id. at 305. Justice Brennan noted that "place of en82
tertainment" included recreational facilities like the Lake
Nixon Club because they provided leisurely activities and "advertise[d] itself as such." Id.
Id. at 307 (arguing that a "natural reading" of the stat83

Id. (noting the history of segregation in this country
88
and the government's compelling interest in providing equal

access to minorities).
89

90

94 F. Supp.2d 856 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
Id. at 862 (demonstrating that §2000a does not cover

retail establishments like a hair salons).

91 Id. at 863. The plaintiff in Halton attempted to link
the hair salon with a "place of public accommodation" under
the statute's catch all provision-§2000a(b) (4). See id.
92
Id. (arguing that tenants in shopping malls change

every year, leaving an "inconsistent result" under Title II if
the court found the hair salon to be a "place of public accommodation").
93

Id. at 862 ("Moreover, if Congress wanted to include,

within the meaning of the statute, other types of establishments such as a service establishment, it could have amended
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Without the reference, the court was hesitant in
94
interpreting Title II otherwise.
Like Halton, Welsh did not automatically interpret "place of exhibition or entertainment"
broadly. 95 Even though the "[Boy Scouts] offer[ed] entertainment to the public at various locations, all of which are 'places,' "96 the Seventh
Circuit declined to link a "membership organization" as a "place of entertainment."9 7 The court
reasoned that Title II's purpose was to "regulate
facilities as opposed to gatherings of people."98
Thus, the phrase "places of entertainment" applies to actual places rather than mere "entertaining" gatherings. 99 Courts may broadly interpret
"places of entertainment," just as long as they
somehow connect to physical places. 10 0 Most
membership organizations however, do not fit
into this category. 10

B.

The Communications Decency Act: An ISP
Loophole?

In 1996, Congress passed the CDA, 10 2 which
originally regulated obscene materials' 0 3 and
granted ISPs publisher immunity from the defamatory Internet messages of its members.' 0 4 Several
civil liberties organizations, notably the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), immediately attacked the "obscene material" content regulation
section.' 0 5 This resulted in the Supreme Court deTide II; after all, Congress has over three decades to do
this.").
94
Id. ("This inaction by Congress could not be a mere
oversight or an expectation that courts would broadly interpret the statute to include basically any type of establishment
because Congress has subsequently defined 'public accommodation' more broadly.").
95
Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th
Cir. 1993).
96
Id.
97 Id. at 1270 (arguing that the purpose of Title II did
not include regulating social groups).
98 Id. at 1269.
99
See id. (noting that the Boy Scouts constituted a group
of people not an actual place).
100 See id. at 1270 (discussing when courts may use a
broad interpretation in Title II with regard to physical locales).
101 Id.; but see Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1272 (summarizing occasions when membership organizations were "places of public

accommodation" under Title II due to their close association
with physical facilities (e.g., a YMCA health club in Smith v.
YMCA of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972), where
the club membership allowed access to a gym/pool)).
102
47 U.S.C. §§223, 230-31 (2000).
103
Id. §223(a), (d) (prohibiting the transmission of ob-

claring it "facially overbroad" and "unconstitutional." 10 6 However, Section 230 (the ISP publisher immunity) remained intact and was subsequently upheld in several federal and state court
cases. 107
1) Section 230: Protecting the Internet's Forum of
Discussion
Congress passed Section 230 in recognition of
the Internet's expanding influence within American society. 10 8 It noted the Internet's "unique"
role in providing a "forum for a true diversity of
political discourse [or] cultural development"' 0 9
and the subsequent federal importance in
"preserv[ing] [its] vibrant and competitive free
market" nature." 0 Thus, Congress provided that
no ISP "shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."" 1 By enacting this
provision, Congress sought to both protect the Internet's role as an unencumbered arena of public
discussion 1 2 and to encourage ISPs to self-regu1 13
late by removing federal constraints.
Section 230 did lay out four important exceptions that would not absolve ISPs from federal and
state liability." 4 The statute would have no effect
on any criminal law procedures (e.g., child sexual
exploitation), 1 5 or on intellectual property cases,
such as copyright violations. 1 6 In addition, state
scene materials to known minors over the Internet).
104

Id. §230.

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that
these CDA provisions were content-based blanket restrictions
which were facially overbroad and in violation of the First
Amendment).
Id. The Court believed that the statute's definition of
106
"indecent" and "patently offensive" was too vague and ambiguous, making enforcement actions by the government arbitrary and unconstitutional in a number of cases. Id.
See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.
107
1997); Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). See
also Michael E. Adler and Henri P. Marcial, Internet Listservs
and Newsgroups: Potential Pitfalls and Legal Ramifications,
19 ACCA DOCKET 79 (2001).
108 See 47 U.S.C. §230(a).
109 Id. §230(a) (3).
110 Id.§230(b) (2).
105

113

Id. §230(c) (1).
Id. §230(b)(1).
Id.§230(c)-(d).

114

Id. §230(e).

115

Id. §230(e) (1).
Id. §230(e)(2).

''M
112

116
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laws consistent with Section 230's provisions still
applied as well as actions under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.1 1 So while
Congress encouraged the Internet's development,
it did not grant ISPs total immunity.I1 8 Instead, it
tried to find an appropriate balance between protecting free expression and the enforcement of
existing federal laws.' 19
2)

The Court's Interpretation of Section 230
of the CDA

Prior to the CDA's enactment, courts relied on
their own judgment in determining whether an
ISP should bear responsibility for their members'
libelous or obscene statements. 120 In Cubby Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc,121 a New York Federal District
Court denied a plaintiffs libel claim because
CompuServe, acting as a "distributor" rather than
a "publisher," never knew about the defamatory
postings on the ISP's "Journalism" bulletin
board.' 22 In contrast, Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co. 123 found an ISP accountable when

it made a "conscious choice" to regulate the content of its bulletin boards, yet through inadvertence failed to properly screen a member's
libelous postings. 2' - 4 Thus, once the ISP decided

to regulate the bulletin board, the court found
"publisher" liability for their members' Internet
messages.

25

1

The CDA resolved this debate by overruling
Stratton Oakmont with Zeran v. America Online,
Inc., 126 which became the signature case affirming
the statute's ISP exception. In Zeran, the Fourth
Id. §230(e) (3), (4).
118 See id. §230(b)(5); see also Doe v. Am. Online, Inc.,
783 So.2d 1010, 1019-1028 (Fla. 2001) (LewisJ., dissenting)
(arguing that the CDA did not exempt ISPs from distributor
liability or child pornography).
117

119

47 U.S.C. §230(b).

See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th
Cir. 1997) (describing the evolution and history leading up
to the passage of §230 of the CDA).
121
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
122
Id. at 141 ("Because CompuServe, as a news distributor, may not be held liable if it neither knew nor had reason
to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements,
summary judgment in favor of CompuServe on the libel
claim is granted.").
123
23 Media L. Rep (BNA) 1794 (NY Sup. Ct. 1995).
124
Id. at 13 ("PRODIGYs conscious choice, to gain the
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater
liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that
made no such choice.").
125
Id. at 10-13. By advertising "monitoring technolo120
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Circuit pointed to Congress's intent with the CDA
to "not deter harmful online speech through the
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties'
potentially

injurious

messages."' 12 7 The

court

noted that Congress specifically removed "publisher" liability from ISPs to encourage self-regulation, 128 and that Section 230's provisions equally
applied to "distributor" liability.' 2 9 In other words,
an ISP will not be held liable for its members' defamatory statements, whether they are aware of
130
them or not.

The Fourth Circuit in Zeran emphasized the futility of attempting to impose automatic liability
on

ISPs. 131

The court reasoned that the Internet,

as opposed to print publishing, has thousands of
messages posted every minute, thereby making it
virtually impossible for ISPs to monitor postings
effectively.1 32 Therefore, Congress created Section 230 to encourage ISPs to creatively attack the
problem themselves, without resorting to shutting
33
down their posting services to avoid liability.1
Thus, the plaintiff in Zeran could not hold AOL
accountable for failing to speedily remove
libelous statements from their online bulletin
boards.

13 4

Most jurisdictions adopted Zeran's stance, including state courts like Florida in Doe v. America
Online, Inc. 135 In Doe, the Florida Supreme Court
held that Section 230 of the CDA pre-empted
Florida law in permitting "distributor" liability
against AOL for failing to remove written chat
room messages advertising child pornography
products. 136 Although a publisher may be respongies" over the board's content, the court believed that the
ISP exercised "editorial control" and were thus liable for all
postings under the theory of "publisher" liability. Id.
126
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
127
Id. at 330-31.
128
Id. at 331 (citing Stratton Oakmont and 47 U.S.C.
§230(b) (4)(2000)).
129
Id. at 331-32. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs
contention that the absence of a "distributor" immunity reference within the CDA meant it was applicable. Id.
130

See id.

Id. at 333.
Id. (arguing that the instantaneous nature of Internet
message boards precludes "distributor" liability).
133
Id. at 331 (noting that "distributor" liability would defeat the CDA's encouragement of self-regtlation since it
would be too costly for ISPs to monitor all questionable
messages).
134
Id. at 328, 335.
135
783 So.2d 1010, 1013, 1018 (Fl. 2001).
136
Id. at 1015-16. This would be different if the third
1'1

132
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sible under Florida tort law if they knew about the
defamatory statements, the court would not extend liability to AOL since under the CDA, they
were neither liable as a "publisher" nor recog7
nized as a "distributor" of the information. 11
Therefore, both Zeran and the CDA rendered the
plaintiff's complaint invalid, since AOL neither
participated in nor endorsed the defamatory chat
138
room messages in question.
The dissent in Doe, however, questioned this
CDA interpretation. Justice Lewis attacked the
analysis in Zeran, arguing that the CDA only applied in cases where ISPs had no notice of the
third party defamatory messages.' 3 9 Justice Lewis
also pointed to the "publisher/distributor" distinction in tort law and reasoned that the CDA's
language only exempted AOL from "publisher"
but not "distributor" liability.' 4°c Because AOL
knew about the chat room messages and did nothing about them, the ISP should not "reap the economic benefits flowing from the activity." 14 1 Moreover, Lewis reasoned that the CDA was meant to
encourage freedom of expression, not enable the
child pornography industry-an area specifically
142
excluded from First Amendment protection.
Overall, courts overwhelmingly endorse Zeran's
reading of the CDA and grant ISPs both "publisher" and "distributor" liability. 143 Nevertheless,
party posted child pornography images because these forms
of communications do not have any First Amendment protections and may be illegal under federal and state criminal
laws. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
137
Id. at 1017. The court linked the actions Doe requested with the immunities granted by the CDA to ISPs. Id.
138
See id. ("[l]t is precisely the liability based upon negligent failure to control the content of users' publishing of allegedly illegal postings on the Internet that is the gravamen
of Doe's alleged cause of action.") (emphasis added).
139
See id. at 1019. The dissent argued that the CDA does
not "totally exonerate and insulate an ISP from responsibility
where, as here, it is alleged that an ISP has acted as a knowing distributor of [child pornography] material . . . by taking

absolutely no steps to curtail continued dissemination ...
when it had the right and power to do so." Id.
140
Id. at 1020-23.
141
Id. at 1024-25 (believing that the majority's interpretation of the CDA "flies in the face of the very purpose" of
the CDA by rewardingcomplacency).
142
Id. at 1026-27.
143
See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C. 1998) (holding that an ISP could not be held liable
for allowing its subscribers access to alleged defamatory
statements posted on the Drudge Report website); Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that the CDA granted AOL immunity from
an inaccurate stock price quotation provided by a third party

Justice Lewis's dissent suggests that the interpretation may be open to argument, leaving the subject
open to further circuit debate.
C.

Hate Speech and the First Amendment: An
Overview of the Case Law

Since most of the prior Internet cases dealt with
libel, a discussion of hate speech and the First
Amendment will be helpful due to the nature of
Noah's chat room messages.' 44 The First Amendment, except under certain limited circumstances, has historically protected hate speech,

145

or speech offensive to a particular race, religion,
147
or ethnic group. 146 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
describes the unique situation when First Amendment protections do not apply, mainly when hate
speech constitutes "fighting words" or speech "by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace."' 148 In Chaplinsky, the Court recognized a New Hampshire statute's legitimate goal in protecting the public from
unnecessary violence (group "fighting words")
while still recognizing a citizen's rights to legitimate free expression. 49 In other words, the State
may have a compelling interest in banning speech
designed to incite a riot, but may not in speech
0
having no effect on public safety.15
financial information source); Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783
So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) (reaffirming a lower court decision
dismissing a plaintiff's state negligence claim regarding a
third party posting in one of the ISP's Internet chat rooms).
144 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 535 (2003) (detailing the content of the messages in
question).
145
See generally Michael Siegel, Comment, Hate Speech,
Civil Rights and the Internet: TheJurisdictionaland Human Rights
Nightmare, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 375 (1999) (pointing to
the differences between the United States and other foreign
countries (Germany and Singapore) in regulating hate
speech and how the United States traditionally guards its citizen's free expression from government oversight).
146
Id. (quoting Human Rights Watch's definition of
hate speech).
147 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
148
Id. at. 572 (determining that fighting words are
"no[t] [an] essential part of any exposition of ideas").
149 See id. at 573.
[W]e are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as this construed contravenes the constitutional right
of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within
the domain of state power, the use in a public place of
words likely to cause a breach of the peace.
Id. (emphasis added).
15(1
See id. at 573.

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

1)

"Mode" v. "Content:" FirstAmendment
Protections Specific to Hate Speech

1 5
Such was the case in R.A. V v. City of St. Pau 1
where the Supreme Court held that a municipal
ordinance banning hate speech was facially invalid because it banned both unprotected "fighting
words" and speech, which by itself does not "inflict[ ] injury or tend[ ] to incite immediate violence." 15 2 The Court reasoned that while the government has the power to regulate fighting words
that have the tendency to promote violence (the
mode of speech), it cannot regulate their belief of
53
a particular idea (the content of the speech).1
Because the St. Paul statute banned racially motivated hate speech in all forms (whether they incited violence or not), the Court believed it
served as a form of content regulation of a person's ideology. 54 Although hate speech by itself
serves no public interest, the majority felt that the
government could not censor the words solely
due to its distastefulness. 155 The Court reasoned
that the First Amendment protects the full expression of ideas, whether those ideas are condemned
by the majority or preserved by a minority. 156

2)

Public Accommodation Laws and Conflicts with
the First Amendment

By recognizing Chaplinksy and R.A.V. 's First
Amendment limitations, one could question the
applicability of public accommodation laws, like
Title II of the Civil Rights Act, in community forums. Specifically, can the government use these
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 380-81 (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464
N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572).
153
Id. at 386-391.
154
Id. at 393-94 ("Rather, it has proscribed fighting
words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort
creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the
expression of particular ideas.").
155
Id. at 392 (arguing that "the point of the First
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed
in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of
its content").
156 Id. at 395-396.
[T]he only interest distinctively served by the content
limitation is that of displaying the city council's special
hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out.
That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids. The
politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility-but not through the means of imposing unique lim151

152
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laws to effectively censor the expressive content of
individual citizens? Hurley v. Irish American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston157 dealt with
this issue in the context of allowing a private St.
Patrick's Day Parade organizing committee the
right to exclude a Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual
group.' 5 In Hurley, the plaintiffs alleged that the
parade committee violated the Massachusetts public accommodation law, which extended the definition of "equal access" to include sexual preference. 159 While the state supreme court agreed
with the plaintiff, 160 the United States Supreme
Court did not, holding that the Massachusetts
public accommodation law violated the parade
161
committee's rights to free expression.
The Court reasoned that the parade committee
was not banning gay, lesbian, and bisexual people
from participating in the parade, but banning
1 62
their use of a Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual banner.
The majority noted that the First Amendment allows private individuals to freely "tailor their
speech, apply[ing] not only to expressions of
value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to
statements of fact the speaker would rather
avoid." 163 In other words, government laws can

neither interfere with this right, nor influence a
private party's decision to endorse or ban one's
expressive content. 64 By forcing the parade committee to alter the content of their parade, the
Court found a form of content discrimination,
which is expressly forbidden by the First Amend65

ment.1

itations upon speakers who (however benightedly) disagree.
Id.
157
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
158
Id. at 559.
159 Id. at 571-72.
160
Id. at 563-564.
161
Id. at 559.
162
Id. at 572 ("[Tjhe disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.").
163
Id. at 573.
164 See id. ("This use of the State's power violates the fundamental rle of protection under the First Amendment,
that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his
own message.").
165
See id. at 579. The Court argued that the state court
was indirectly influencing what type of content the parade
organizers had to promote, thus violating their speaker rights
under the First Amendment.
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II.

NOAH V AOL TIME WARNER- PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION LAW AND THE
CHAT ROOM

In July 2000, plaintiff Saad Noah cancelled his
AOL Internet service account "in protest."1 66 He
allegedly complained to America Online management, including CEO Steve Case, of several offensive Internet postings in an AOL chat room devoted to Islamic topics. 167 After AOL allegedly
failed to remove or address these derogatory
messages, Mr. Noah decided to cancel his membership. 168
In September 2002, Noah filed a suit in Federal
District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. 169 He alleged that AOL's failure to remove
these messages constituted, inter alia, (1) a violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act and (2) a
breach of AOL's Terms of Service and Membership Agreement by not policing and/or monitoring its chat rooms for offensive remarks. 7 0° Since
the messages specifically dealt with discriminatory
remarks about Islam, Noah alleged that AOL's
failure to remove them violated his equal enjoyment of a "place of public accommodation"17
AOL's chat rooms. 1

active computer service provider" requirement
and did not have any role in producing the offensive postings in question. 75 Since Noah's Title II
claim treated AOL as a publisher, the court dismissed his suit because the CDA specifically exempted ISPs from publisher liability for the third
1 76
party postings in AOL's chat rooms.
In addition, the opinion stated that the CDA
applied to Federal Civil Rights claims and did not
come under Section 230's four exceptions.' 7

7

Al-

though the hate speech in question did not contribute to the "diversity of political discourse,"' 17
Judge Ellis noted that Section 230 balanced out
Congress's concerns for protecting a citizen's
freedom of speech with the expense and potentially devastating effect liability would impose on
the Internet's development.17 9

Therefore,

the

CDA shielded AOL from responsibility for the
third party content of their chat rooms.'8 0
Besides the CDA, Judge Ellis stated that Noah's
suit failed because chat rooms are not "places of
public accommodation" within the meaning of Title 11.181 He noted that Title II's plain language
and the majority of case law held that a "place of
8
public accommodation" be physical in nature.1'

2

Judge Ellis disagreed with Noah's contentions
and dismissed his suit for failure to state a valid
claim. 172 Judge Ellis found that Noah's Title II allegation failed for two separate reasons.' 7 3 First,
AOL as an ISP was granted immunity for its members' Internet messages under Section 230 of the
CDA. 174 Quoting Section 230's statutory language
and Zeran v. America Online extensively, Judge Ellis
reasoned that AOL fulfilled Section 230's "inter-

Although some federal circuits ruled that a "place
of public accommodation" could be non-physical,'8 3 Judge Ellis felt that this applied only to
ADA cases, not Title II.184 He also relied on a similar ADA case, Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines,
Co., which ruled that an Internet website was not a
"place of public accommodation" because of its
non-physical characteristics.' 8 5 Without a physical
component, the Judge found that chat rooms do

Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 532,
166
535 (E.D. Va. 2003).
167
Id. at 535.
168
Id.

Id. at 540 (quoting §230(a)(3) of the CDA).
Id. ("Nonetheless, §230 reflects Congress's judgment
that imposing liability on [ISPs] for the harmful speech of
others would likely do more harm than good, by exposing
[them] to unmanageable liability and potentially leading to
the closure or restriction of such open forums as AOL's chat
rooms").
180 See id.
181 Id.
182
Id. at 540-45 (citing Welsh, Clegg, Parker,Ford v. Scher-

169

Id. at 536.

Id.
Id.
172
Id. at 532.
173
Id. at 537.
174 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (2000) and quoting
Zeran, "Thus, the 'plain language' of §230 'creates a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make [ISPs] liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service'" 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).
170
171

175

Id. at 538.

Id. at 539. ("[A]s the Fourth Circuit made clear in
176
Zeran, all suits seeking to place a service provider in a publisher's role in this manner are barred under §230.").
177
Id. (discussing the four relevant statutory exemptions
to CDA immunity and concluding that Noah's civil rights
claim did not fit into any of them).

178
179

ing-Plough Corp, 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), and Access
Now).
183
Id. at 543 (noting how the First Circuit in Carparts
and the Seventh Circuit in Mutual of Omaha found no
mandatory requirement for a physical "place of public accommodation").
184
Id. at 543, n.9; see also discussion of the Title II/ADA

analogy infra Part III.A.2.
185
Id. at 544; see supra notes 69-74 and discussion of the
Access Nour, see also Hudson, supra note 16.
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not fit into Title II's definition of a "place of exhi186

bition or entertainment."
Lastly, Judge Ellis dismissed Noah's breach of
contract claim. 18 7 By carefully analyzing the language of the ISP's Terms of Service ("TOS"), he
noted that AOL only promised to enforce violations "at its sole discretion."' 88 The TOS also disclaimed the ISP from the failure to remove inappropriate content. 189 Having addressed and dismissed all of the plaintiffs issues, Judge Ellis
threw out Mr. Noah's suit. 190
III.

ANALYZING NOAH: HOW TITLE II
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAW, THE
CDA, AND FIRST AMENDMENT
PRINCIPLES ALL LEAD TO NO
LIABILITY

Noah v. AOL Time Warner focuses on a simple,
yet unresolved issue: how the courts should classify Internet forums. 19 1 Proponents and opponents of Title II inclusion present compelling arguments: from the need to preserve important
and necessary anti-discrimination laws,' 92 to not
hampering the development and viability of an in19 3
creasingly important communications medium.
Resolving this debate rests largely on how one ultimately views the Internet, and by extension, chat
rooms. Does it represent a convenient substitute
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 544-45.
Id. at 545. ("Plaintiff's breach of contract claim must
likewise be dismissed because the contractual rights plaintiff
claims are simply not provided for in AOL's Member Agreement.").
186

187

188

Id.

189 Id. ("The Membership Agreement states that while
AOL 'reserve[s] the right to remove content that, in AOL's
judgment, does not meet its standards or does not comply
with AOL's current Community Guidelines . . .AOL is not

responsible for any failure or delay in removing such material."').
196

Id. at 546.

191 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th
Cir. 1997) (noting the dilemma Congress faced in balancing
out free speech concerns while still enforcing federal/state
laws when passing the CDA).
192
See Tara Thomson, Comment, Locating Discrimination:
Interactive Web Sites as PublicAccommodations Under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act, 2002 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 409 (2002) (arguing
that chat rooms are "places of public accommodation" under
Title II and that the law would be subverted if not extended
to the Internet).
193 See 47 U.S.C. §230(a) (3) (2000) (discussing the
CDA's purpose in preserving the Internet's free expression).
194 See Thomson, supra note 192, at 436-40 (finding that
the Internet's infrastructure equipment (servers) constitute
actual facilities).
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to a physical location 194 or a separate sphere alto1

gether?

5

This Note argues for the latter and emphasizes
how traditional federal laws, such as Title II, do
not apply to this electronic medium. Doing otherwise ignores some of the vital elements needed
for a valid Title II claim: a "physical" facility1 96 and
a "discriminatory intent."1' 9 7 Congress may have
intended a broad interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act, 198 but applying it to cyberspace goes
too far by contradicting the subsequent case law's
strict adherence to the "physical" world. 199 More
significant than Title II's language, chat rooms
also escape federal content oversight because of
the government's traditional protection of the Internet's development and the possible conflict
with the First Amendment. Forcing ISPs to censor discriminatory messages goes against the goals
behind the CDA 200 and interferes with the chat
room's growing importance as an avenue of pub2 1
lic discussion. 0
A.

Chat Rooms Are Not "Places of Public
Accommodation" under Title II

1)

Let's Get Physical! Title II's Main Requirement of
an Actual Facility
The Internet, by its basic definition, does not

195
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 334 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 850 (1997) ("[I]t is 'a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide communication."'); see also Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 544 ("[A] chat room does not exist in a particular
physical location, indeed it can be accessed almost anywhere.")).
196 See discussion of Welsh, Clegg, Access Now, and Noah
and their holdings for a "physical" place of public accommodation supra Part I.A.1.
197
See infra notes 278-84 and accompanying text, which
discusses Akiyama and Boyle's "discriminatory intent" requirement for a valid Title II claim.
198 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text that
summarizes Daniel v. Paul's broad interpretation of a "place
of entertainment."
199 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 544 ("In sum, whether
one relies on the Title II case law or looks to the broader
ADA definition of public place of accommodation, it is clear
that the logic of the statute and the weight of authority indicate that "places of entertainment" must be actual physical
facilities.").
200
See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (describing Zeran, Doe
v. Am. Online, and Noah and their opinions describing Congress's intent in passing the CDA).
201
See discussion infra Part III.C (arguing that chat
rooms help promote the expansion of public ideas and viewpoints).
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have a designated physical location, but instead
exists on the computers and telephone networks
2 2
of the world's communications backbone. 0
Equating it as a "place" appears to confine its very
essence, since the Internet, unlike physical structures, can expand indefinitely, unburdened by
any geographical barriers. 2113 Thus, Judge Ellis was
correct in ruling that Internet chat rooms fail Title II's primary requirement of either being an actual facility or at least connected to one. 20 4 It is
hard to imagine that Congress intended Title II to
cover existential "places" like the Internet, a community made up of light waves and electronic im20 5
pulses.
Examining the statute itself proves that Title II
clearly applies solely to physical locations. 20 6 As
Noah points out, the statute primarily refers to, or
gives examples of, actual facilities in its four categories: lodging establishments, eateries, physical
entertainment venues, or establishments physi' 20 7
cally located within a "covered establishment."
Of course, one can postulate that Title II should
not be read so literally and that chat rooms could
serve as "quasi-physical" locations in cyberspace. 20 8 They are, after all, chat rooms. But several circuits already rejected a non-physical definition for "places of public accommodation," arguing like Judge Ellis that "Congress intended [Title
II] to reach only the listed facilities and other similar physical structures."' 20 9 Both Welsh and Clegg
202
See generally Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-853 (providing a
brief overview and history of the Internet's development).
203
See id.
204
Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 532,
542-43 (2003) (citing Welsh and Clegg).
205
See Hudson, supra note 16.
206
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §2000a (2000); Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1993); Clegg
v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
207
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 54142 (listing the examples
given in §2000a, all of which are actualnot "virtual"facilities).
208
See Thomson, supra note 192 at 43940 (arguing that
chat rooms have elements of "placeness" because of the Internet's physical servers and networks).
209
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 542 (citing Daniel, Welsh, and

Clegg).
210
See discussion of Welsh supra notes 41-44 (holding that
membership organizations not connected to physical facilities failed Title II's statutory requirement).
211
See supra notes 49-52, discussing Clegg's holding which
followed Welsh's reasoning of a mandatory physical facility requirement.
212
See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270 ("We refuse to read into
the statute what Congress has declined to include."); See also
Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir.

declined to extend Title II to two non-physical
2
membership organizations: the Boys Scouts "'
and Cult Awareness Group. 21 1 Without the connection to a specific physical facility, the Welsh
and Clegg courts reasoned that it would usurp
Congress's legislative powers by independently
reading Title II so broadlyY' 2 Federalism concerns between the judiciary and legislative
branches also mandate a cautionary approach
before courts attempt to read a statute beyond its
"plain meaning."213
These attempts at restraint appear to contradict
the Supreme Court's broad reading of Title II in
both Daniel v. Paul and Miller v. Amusement Enterprises.2 14 After all, amusement parks2 15 and recreational parks2 1 6 were not listed as examples in Title
II's statutory language. But as Welsh and Noah
point out, these broad readings only applied to
"facilities" that were already "physical."2 1 7 Indeed,
while the term "entertainment" can certainly be
seen as "ambiguous,"2 1 8 the term "physical" seems
straightforward. 2 19 For this reason, Welsh and Clegg
could not justify labeling a non-physical membership club as a "place of public accommodation"
when these groups' main purposes had nothing
220
to do with an actual "place."
Therefore, if Welsh and Clegg would not extend
Title II to non-physical membership clubs, it
stands to reason that a link cannot be made to a
non-physical Internet service like AOL's chat
1994).
213
See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1271 ("Certainly, federal judges
must not reach out and grasp at straws in an attempt to rewrite the laws duly enacted by the legislative branch of government, the Congress."). See also Access Now Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp.2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
("... [C]ourts must follow the law as written and wait for
Congress to adopt or revise legislatively.").
214
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing Daniel v. Paul and the need for effective enforcement
against segregation and racism).
215
See Miller v. Amusement Enterprises Inc, 394 F.2d
342 (5th Cir. 1968).
216
See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1969).
217
See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270; see also Noah v. AOL Time
Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 532, 542 (2003).
218
See Daniel, 393 U.S. at 307-08 (arguing that Congressional intent implied a broad reading of the term "entertainment" which did not restrict an understanding to the statti-

tory language).
219 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269 (arguing that "the clear
language of the statute mandates a different conclusion"
from the plaintiff).
220 Id. at 1272; Clegg, 18 F.3d at 756 (highlighting the
cautionary approach courts should take before interpreting
beyond Congress's "plain meaning").
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rooms. 2 2 1 Both groups share similar traits in that

they are not connected to a particular physical location. 2 22 Instead, they serve the primary purpose
of bringing people together as a group rather
than under an actual facility.2 23 Unlike the Boy
Scouts, the Cult Awareness Group, or Daniel's recreational park, AOL's chat room participants have
no physical interaction with each other and do not
meet in any actualfacilities-like private homes or
community centers. 22 4 Thus, Judge Ellis reasonably inferred that AOL's chat rooms were outside
Title II's scope in regulating physical "places of
2 25
public accommodation."
Proponents of Title II inclusion argue that chat
rooms do in fact fulfill the physicality requirement. 226 They reason that chat rooms are in fact
connected to actual facilities, since physical servers
2 27
and computer networks make up the Internet.
While this argument looks promising, recent Internet court decisions appear to hold the opposite. 228 For example, Judge Ellis notes that Torres
v. AT&T Broadband LLC 229 rejected the notion

that an on-screen cable guide was a "place of public accommodation" simply because of its digital
cable transmission equipment. 23 ° Since "in no way
does viewing the system's images require the
plaintiff to gain access to any actual physical pubContra Thomson, supra note 192, at 436-42 (arguing
that Carpartsand Doe v. Mutual of Omaha allow chat rooms to
be considered "places of public accommodation" despite lack
of physicality).
222
See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing Welsh and Clegg); see
also Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534 (reviewing the attributes of
the Boy Scouts in the context of "places of public accommodation").
223
Compare membership clubs in Welsh and Clegg, supra
Part 1.A.1, with AOL chat room in Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at
221

534.
224
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534-35 (summarizing the
composition of chat rooms).
225
Id. at 540-41. Given the legal precedent and
§2000(a)'s "plain meaning," a forum (chat room) not connected to an actual facility does not satisfy the elements of

Title II.
226
See Thomson, supra note 192, at 43540 (discussing
the legal scholarship of DavidJohnson and David Post, which
equated the Internet medium with traditional forms of physical space for jurisdictional purposes).
227
Id. at 438-40 (arguing that the Internet's servers and
networks meet Wesh's requirement of physical facilities).
228
See, e.g., Access Now Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.,
228 F. Supp.2d 1312, 1319-1322 (S.D.FI. 2002).
229
158 F. Supp.2d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
230
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 544 (quoting Torres, 158 F.
Supp.2d at 1037-38).
231
Torres, 158 F. Supp.2d at 1038 (holding that the plaintiff's use of a digital cable box did not require him to access
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lic place," Torres reasoned that the equipment was
23 1
not akin to a "place of public accommodation."
Access Now v. Southwest Airlines reached a similar
conclusion in refusing to equate a website or any
232
other "virtual" place as a physical facility.

More importantly, this "server theory" appears
to fail because servers, or any computer connected to them, are not necessarily accessible to
the public. 23 3 Indeed, AOL customers cannot
physically access the company's servers at all.
These facilities represent proprietary equipment
only accessible to AOL employees, not AOL customers. In fact, thousands of private computers
and network servers make up Internet. Therefore, if the facilities being linked (individual computers and servers) are not open to the public, they
cannot be "places of public accommodation.

2 34

Finally, applying the server theory to Title II
public accommodation law may have some impractical and potentially burdensome consequences to the growing use of interactive electronic connectivity devices. So much of today's
new communications technology, from text messaging services via Personal Digital Assistants
("PDAs") to the Video-on-Demand feature of digital cable companies, utilize virtual networks similar to Internet chat rooms. 2 - 5 If one applied the
the cable company's actual network transmission facilities).
232
See Access Now, 228 F. Supp.2d at 1318 (ruling that the
blind plaintiff did not access a physical ticket counter when
accessing the airline's website).
233 See Torres, 158 F. Supp.2d at 1037-38 (holding that
since the plaintiff used his online cable guide from his personal television, he did not have access to a "place of public
entertainment").
234 See id. Torres and Noah are similar in that an ISP customer only has to use a modem to access AOL's chat rooms;
the customer does not access AOL's brick and mortar facilities/datacenters (containing the ISP's network servers). See
id.
235 All of these services depend on "Internet-like" network structures to utilize their features. For example, PDA's
use Wi-Fi wireless technology to access ISP message servers to
download their customer's e-mails. See Palm One, Wireless Email Access, at http://www.palmone.com/us/wireless/web
browser.html. Video on Demand customers use their digital
cable boxes to contact the cable company's server to
download and watch their chosen movie. See Motorola Broadband Network Infrastructure Solutions, at http://broadband.
motorola.com/nis/video-on-demand.html. X-Box video
game hardware owners can sign up for an interactive gaming
service called X-Box Live, which allows customers to play
games and access chat rooms via a broadband internet connection from their X-Box equipment. See About X-Box Live,
at http://www.xbox.com/en-US/live/about/Features-Intro
ToXboxLive.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
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server theory, a consumer's TiVO on-screen television guide, Blackberry e-mail account, or X-Box's
online interactive video game service may all be
considered "place[s] of public accommodation."2 36 Although the Torres holding seems to
suggest otherwise (the services' physical servers
are not open to the public), applying the server
theory to the modern marketplace has broad implications and places in doubt the argument that
Congress really intended Title II's provisions to
2 37
extend beyond the physical world.
2)

Carparts and Doe v. Mutual of Omaha: A Shaky
Title H Comparison

By citing similar decisions under the ADA's Tidle III public accommodation statute, Noah
claimed that Title II did not necessarily require a
physical component. 238 But can one really use
these ADA case holdings in arguing Title II
cases? 239 As Judge Ellis indicated, the basis of Mr.
Noah's broad interpretation theory rested on the
ADA's Title III statutory language, not on Title
11.240 Thus, he noted, it may be inappropriate to
analogize the ambiguities, as "the Civil Rights Act
does not include a 'travel service,' 'insurance office,' or 'other service establishments' in its definition." 241 To Ellis, Title II may therefore have a
more solid physicality requirement than the
236
Cf Thomson, supra note 192 at 43540. Applying the
server theory, one could analogize TIVO's online TV schedule database or the Blackberry user's e-mail servers as physical
facilities. See TiVO, at http://www.tivo.com/1.3.1.asp (last
visited Feb. 10, 2004) (describing TIVO's dial-up service,
which updates the unit's scheduling function), and Blackberry Wireless, at http://www.blackberry.com/products/ser
vice/email.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2004) (explaining the
Blackberry mobile e-mail service).
237
See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text, which
discusses the Tor-es decision and how utilizing one's digital
cable box did not require access to the company's transmission facilities.
238
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 543.
239
But see Thomson, supra note 192 at 428-430 (arguing
that one may analogize ADA case law with Title II cases).
240
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 543 n.9 (noting how Carparts
relies strictly on the ADA language, which is different from
Title II's).
241
Id.
242
See id. at 543 ("Thus, it appears that the weight of authority endorses the 'actual physical structure' requirement
in the ADA context as well.").
243
See 42 U.S.C. §12187(7) (2000); see also discussion of
the category differences between ADA and Title II supra
notes 56-57.
244
Compare the "social evils" being protected in Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969), with Carparts Distribution

ADA.

242

In addition, the ADA has a much more extensive list of categories than Title II, implying a
broader intent compared with the Civil Rights
Act. 243 While certainly similar in nature, combating discrimination against disabled people emphasizes different goals and problems than discrimination against a cultural group. 244 For example, disabled people often face physical accessibility issues (e.g., no adequate ramps) 2 45 that an ethnic group, like Asian Americans, rarely deals with.
It may be for this reason that Congress created a
more extensive list of categories in the ADA, since
the two statutes' discrimination history developed
24 6
differently.
Doubt also remains as to whether courts that accept the Carpartsand Doe v. Mutual of Omaha ADA
holdings would use the same broad interpretation
in Title II cases. 24 7 The Seventh Circuit decided
both the Welsh and later Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
appellate court cases; 2 48 yet, Mutual of Omaha does
not mention Welsh in its opinion. 249 If the Seventh
Circuit truly believed in a broad public accommodation theory for both Title II and the ADA, why
did it not overrule Welsh's "physical" requirement
when deciding Mutual of Omaha? This suggests
that the two laws are not necessarily analogous
and should be interpreted using different standards. 2 50 Even a cursory look at the totality of
Ctr. Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass'n. of New England Inc., 37
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994).
245
See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198
F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the "access" component of Title III and providing examples of a proper ADA
suit (e.g., wheelchair ramp and elevator accessibility issues)).
246
CompareJustice Brennan's discussion of congressional
Title II intent in Daniel,395 U.S. at 307 ("[T]o move the daily
affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of
access to [public] facilities...") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88914, at 18 (1964)), with the ADA as discussed in Carparts, 37
F.3d at 19 ("[T]o bring individuals with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of American life ....
)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 101485, at 99 (1991)). This by itself
reflects a more extensive policy aim with the ADA.
247
Most courts interpreting the ADA reject Carpart'sextensive "place of public accommodation" holding. See, e.g.,
Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp.2d
1312, 1318 (S.D.Fla. 2002).
248
Welsh was decided on May 17, 1993, while Mutual of
Omaha was decided on June 2, 1999. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts
of Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
249
See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir.
1999).
250
See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 543 n.9 (2003).
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ADA public accommodation cases reveals a split
in deciding the necessity of the physicality compo-

rooms as more of a discussion group, especially in
the rooms focusing on particular topics like Is-

nent.

clubs, like the Boys Scouts, can certainly provide
many "recreational" activities.2 56 However, the
Scouts still did not fall under Tide II's jurisdiction
because they did not function "as a 'ticket' to ad2 57
mission to a [physical] facility or location."
Thus, the focus of these excepted groups was "interaction" with people rather than access to en2 58
tertainment.
Like the Boy Scouts, a court could view chat

lamic culture. 25 9 The primary purpose of these
chat rooms centers on "cultural enrichment" and
gathering people of similar backgrounds rather
than acting as a physical location offering recreational activities. 260 Some members might even
consider themselves part of a family or even a support network like Alcoholics Anonymous, distinctions far removed from a "place of entertainment."261 Defined in this manner, chat rooms
could fulfill Welsh's membership club exemption,
262
thus freeing them from Title II regulation.
Still, some critics could point to chat rooms'
close connection to other online entertainment
products, thus coloring them as a "place of entertainment."' 2 6 3 United States. v. Baird already
holds that a facility containing even a small
amount of recreational activities makes them a
"place of entertainment." 264 However, Baird focused on a video game already within a 7-Eleven
store's premises. 26 5 Since most chat rooms are located in a segregated section of the website, the
peripheral "entertainment" products might not
matter. 266 As demonstrated in Halton v. Great
Clips, a non-entertainment facility (i.e., a hair salon) does not necessarily fall under Title II even
though it was located in a shopping center with
some "recreational" or "covered" facilities (i.e.,
restaurants in Halton's case) .267

Id. at 543-44 (highlighting the ADA circuit split over
251
the physicality issue).
See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269-70. Cf Thomson, supra
252
note 192, at 442-445 (arguing that chat rooms are "places of
entertainment" with the presence of stylized scripts, icons,
and proximity to online gaming options).
253
Id.; see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305-08 (1969)
(holding that a lakeside club offered "recreational activities"
with access to a snack bar and swimming/boating facilities).
254
See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269-76. But see Thomson,
supra note 192, at 443-44 (arguing that chat rooms fall out of
the "social relationship" distinction by being analogized to
"coffee houses," "dance clubs," and other areas of social interaction).
See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270.
255
Id. at 1269. Plaintiff in Welsh claimed the Boy Scouts
256
'"offer[ed] entertainment to the public at various locations,
all of which are 'places.'" Id.
Id. at 1272.
257
See id. at 1275 ("While it is true that 'people' and not
258
'places' are the source of discrimination, in Title II Congress
focused exclusively on prohibiting discrimination in places of
public accommodation and not in every conceivable social relationship.").
259
See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 534-35 (2003) (describing chat rooms in general, in particular AOL's Muslim chat rooms).

260
Compare the function and activities of the AOL chat
room in Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534-35 with the Lakeside
recreational park in Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305-08
(1969), which offered a lakeside snack bar as well as boating
and swimming facilities.
261 See id.
262
See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1278 ("Man is a human being
who has a sociological need to join with others in order to
develop his full being and to fulfill his need for companionship as well as enjoyment. Congress, in drafting Title II certainly did not intend to interfere with the development of the
whole man.").
See discussion of United States v. Baird supranotes 84263
88; see also Thomson, supra note 192, at 444 (arguing that
chat rooms could better fit the "entertainment" description if
chat rooms combined online gaming and other recreational
options within their service platform).
264
85 F.3d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1996).
265
See id. at 453-54.
266
See Halton v. Great Clips Inc., 94 F. Supp.2d 856, 863
(N.D. Ohio 2000). A chat room could be seen as a "separate
store" of the ISP like Halton's hair salon within a shopping
center containing Title II covered establishments.
267
Id. (finding that Title II's catch-all provision
(§2000a(b) (4)) did not apply since the hair salon did not
have "exclusive control" over the makeup of the shopping
center's tenants).

3)

25 1

Chat Rooms: Social Group or "Placeof
Entertainment?"

Besides the physicality element, chat rooms
could also fail the "place of public accommodation" designation due to the online forum's misapplication as a "place of exhibition or entertainment."2 5 2 Though courts tend to view "entertainment" broadly, this does not necessarily mean that
a chat room serves a "recreational" function. 253 In
fact, one could argue that chat rooms more likely
resemble a social membership club, similar to the
Boy Scouts in Welsh, thus falling out of Title II's
"place of entertainment" category. 2 54
Welsh noted that by passing Title II, Congress
did not intend to regulate "a wide spectrum of
consensual human relationships."'2

55

Membership
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Nevertheless, courts might not find chat rooms
analogous to the Great Clips hair salon because
Halton's defendant had no control over the activities or tenants of the shopping center.2 68 On the
other hand, large ISPs like AOL often own and
control both the chat room as well as other "entertainment" products. 2Y61 Fortunately, Title II still
requires proximity or some connection to a physical "place of exhibition or entertainment," so Internet chat rooms still fail the statute's defini27 0
tion.
B.

An Inherent Immunity: How Chat Room
Accessibility and the CDA's Provisions Help
Prevent Title II Applicability

Besides the "[physical] place of public accommodation" distinction, Title II may not apply to
chat rooms because of the Internet's "democratic"
nature 27 I and its traditional protection by the government. 272 One of the primary reasons behind
the enactment of Title II was to ensure equal access to people of all races and beliefs.2 73 Thus, Title II may not necessarily apply to chat rooms because they are largely open to anyone with Internet
access. 274 In addition, Zeran and Noah point to
protective government laws like the CDA, which
grant ISPs significant immunity from traditional
forms of federal regulation (e.g., Title II).275
Thus, the law has the potential to preempt a Civil
Rights lawsuit from ever going to trial in a chat
276
room case.
See id.
See description of AOL's Membership Features, at
http://www.corp.aol.com/whoweare/ (summarizing all of
AOL's offerings and services) (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
270
See supraPart III.A.1 (discussing the "physical" facility
requirement of Title II).
271
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851-52 (1997)
(describing the overall composition of the Internet and the
explosion of communications mediums and public expression it has spawned).
272
See supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the CDA's passage and the policy behind granting ISPs "publisher" immunity).
273
See United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450, 454-55 (9th
Cir. 1996) (describing how Title II was meant to cure the
"great evil" of denying African Americans, Jews, and Native
Americans access to public areas because of their race).
274
See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 534 (E.D.Va. 2003) (discussing how one can participate
in an AOL chat room).
275
See supra notes 126-134 and accompanying text (discussing the broad "publisher" immunity the CDA grants
ISPs).
276
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 539.
268
269

1)

How the Chat Room's Open Nature Provides
"EqualAccess" To Everyone

"Discriminatory intent" represents one of the
most crucial elements of a successful Title II
suit.2 77 In Akiyama v. U.S.Judo Inc.,27 1 a federal district court in Washington dismissed the plaintiffs
Title II case because he could not prove that a
judo club's bowing requirement constituted deliberate religious discrimination. 2 79 The court reasoned that Title II's language required an "intentional" act of discrimination and that failure to accommodate a person's religious beliefs completely
did not rise to that level. 2 0 Boyle v. Jerome Country

Club28 1 reached a similar holding, finding that a
golf club's decision to hold a tournament on Sunday did not discriminate against the plaintiffs
Mormon religion. 28 2 Since the defendant had a
valid non-discriminatory reason for the decisionfinancial constraints, the plaintiff failed to estab'2
lish the necessary "discriminatory intent."

3

Taking this into account, the case for Title II
application to chat rooms appears weak. After all,
admission into most chat rooms does not require
the disclosure of racial or religious affiliation, with
most only asking users to choose a user identification and password. 2 84 While some registration
forms may require additional information, a person's religious beliefs or race rarely causes an ISP
to deny them access to a chat room. 28

5

In fact,

most ISP services like AOL encourage their Internet users to behave responsibly and avoid any
277
See Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., F. Supp.2d 1179 (W.D.
Wash. 2002); see also Boyle v. Jerome Country Club, 883 F.
Supp. 1422 (D. Idaho 1995). The two cases involve Title II
suits brought under religious discrimination grounds similar
to Mr. Noah's complaint. Id.
278
181 F. Supp.2d 1179 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
279
Id. at 1186-87. The plaintiff claimed that the judo
club's requirement for him to bow at inanimate objects
before tournament matches discriminated against his religious beliefs. Id.
280
Id. at 1185-86 (discussing how in both "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment" Title II cases, the plaintiff
must prove a deliberate "discriminatory intent" by the defendant).
281
883 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Idaho 1995).
282
Id. at 1432 (finding that enough proof did not exist
establishing that the club's decision stemmed from discrimination against Mormons).

283

Id. at 1431.

See Thomson, supra note 192, at 441 (describing the
process of signing up for an AOL, Yahoo, and MSN IDs).
285
See AOL registration website, at http://my.screen
name.aol.com (requiring only a user name, password, birthday, and e-mail address. There is no mandatory requirement
284
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language or behavior that may disparage a person's particular race or faith. 2 6 Thus, the relatively open membership process and lack of any religious or racial profiling suggests that ISPs could
not easily develop a "discriminatory" intent to
28 7 If
deny admission into their Internet forums.
access represents a primary component of a Tide
II suit, the non-selectivity of chat room admission
seems to disprove the element of a "discrimina28
tory intent."
The CDA: Consistently Seen by Courts as a
Barrier to Third Party ISP Liability

2)

More significant than a chat room's open nature or even Title II itself, the CDA presents a formidable barrier to holding ISPs liable for the
hateful postings of its members. 28 9 As Judge Ellis
points out in Noah, the few legal cases dealing
with the issue have all reached similar conclusions
in finding no third party liability.2 90 A careful

analysis of Section 230's language reveals a deliberate attempt at shielding ISPs from government
enforced monitoring systems to censor potentially
defamatory messages. 291 Therefore, it does not
make sense for courts to impose Tide II on chat
room messages since this essentially requires ISPs
to perform a censoring duty that Congress specifically exempted.

292

Critics, like Justice Lewis in Doe v. America Onfor the disclosure of racial or religious information.) (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
See AOL Member Agreement, at http://legal.web.aol.
286
com/aol/aolpol/memagree.html, and the AOL Rules of
Member Conduct at http://www.aol.com/copyright/rules.
html. (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
287
Compare Title II's "discriminatory intent" requirement supra notes 277-83 and AOL's actions in Noah v. AOL
Time Warner, 261 F. Supp.2d 532, 534-36 (E.D. Va. 2003).
No evidence presented in Noah firmly established that AOL
denied Mr. Noah access to their chat rooms because of the
plaintiff's religion. In fact, Mr. Noah terminated his account
on his own accord. Id. at 535.
288
See Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp.2d 1179, at
1185-87; see also Boyle, 883 F. Supp. at 1431-32; Noah, 261 F.
Supp. at 534-36. Since chat rooms rarely ask for religious affiliation, there are a number of more probable non-discriminatory reasons for failing to monitor message content.
289
See 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (2000) (providing ISPs
broad "publisher" immunity from third party content in In-

ternet postings).
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 538-39 (describing the
290
holdings of Zeran v. Am. Online, Green v. Am. Online, Blumenthal v. Drudge, and Ben Ezra Weinstein & Co v. Am. Online Inc).
291

See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31
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line, point to the publisher/distributor liability
tort distinction 293 and believe that ISPs have an
implied responsibility to screen out libelous
messages in which they have notice. 29 4 This situation fits into Mr. Noah's case, as he sent several emails complaining about the chat room's discriminatory messages to AOL management. 295 Unfortunately, it also highlights a rather obvious inconsistency: would Congress pass a law giving ISPs
"publisher" liability yet require responsibility indi296
rectly through "distributor" liability?
This reasoning seems to contradict the CDA's
intent of removing barriers to the Internet's
growth and development. 29 7 As Zeran notes, the
potentially burdensome requirement of monitoring thousands of messages a day was a central
finding behind the CDA's passage. 29 8 ISPs would
probably face financial ruin or as Noah points out,
shut down their chat rooms before they accept liability as distributors. 29 9 Therefore, Zeran represents the better CDA interpretation as it preserves
the law's spirit in shielding ISPs from liability concerns of third party actions in which they had no
300
involvement.
In fact, the potential for burdening the Internet's development could demonstrate a lack of
"discriminatory intent" when ISPs fail to censor
discriminatory chat room messages. 3 0' AOL's lack
of monitoring and alleged unwillingness to remove the messages could have nothing to do with
(4th Cir. 1997) (discussing the CDA's statutory language).
292
See id. Requiring the monitoring of messages for instances of racial discrimination seems similar to Zeran's analogy of "editing" one's product as a publisher. See id.
293
Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1019-25 (Fla.
2001) (Lewis, J. dissenting) (highlighting the absence of a
Congressional grant of "distributor" immunity within the
CDA's language).
294
Id.
295
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535.
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331-34 (holding that §230's lan296

guage treats publishers and distributors equally when granting ISPs defamation immunity).
297 See 47 U.S.C. §230(b) (2) (2000).
298
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (describing the problems

ISPs could face if forced to monitor all their members'
messages).
299
See Noah, 261 F. Supp. at 540.
300
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (arguing that the plaintiff
could not equate AOL as a distributor without first finding it
as a publisher - either way, the CDA grants ISPs immunity
from both).

so

See Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp.2d 1179,

1185-87 (W.D.Wa. 2002); see also Boyle v. Jerome Country
Club, 883 F. Supp. 1422, 1431-32 (D.Idaho 1995).
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Mr. Noah's religious beliefs. 30 2 The cost in effectively removing all potentially harmful messages
from chat rooms could be significant, 3° 3 since
Zeran points out that members post hundreds of
messages every hour. 30 4 With the current technology, an ISP could not possibly filter out everything 11 5 Their current difficulty in curbing e-mail
spam only emphasizes the point. 30 6 Therefore,
the CDA's rationale could be analogous to Boyle's
Sunday golf tournament in that AOL and ISPs
have a legitimate non-discriminatory reason (i.e.,
financial constraints) 30 7 for having an un3 08

monitored chat room.
C.

Title II, Chat Rooms, and the First
Amendment: A Conflict in Authority?

Even if courts concluded that Title II's "place of
public accommodation" language included chat
rooms, the First Amendment would remain a final
hurdle to suits like Mr. Noah's. 30 9 Since chat
rooms provide a convenient forum for public discussion, the question remains as to whether the
federal government has the authority to force
ISPs to censor their members' messages. 3 10 After
all, one could view the Internet as the "new American street corner" 3 11 where people can freely ex302
See Akiyama, 181 F. Supp.2d at 1185-87; see also Boyle,
883 F. Supp. at 1431-32. Because of their open chat room
admission process, AOL had no specific or immediate knowledge of Mr. Noah's religious faith. See Noah, 261 F. Supp. at
535-36.
303
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (highlighting the daunting
proposition of monitoring instantaneous chat room postings).
304
See id.
305
See id.
306
See Saul Hansell, The Bandwagon To Fight Spam Hits a
Bump, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at CI (describing the difficulties that ISPs and Congress face in fighting the "nuisance"
of spam and other "unwanted e-mail advertising").
307
See Boyle, 883 F. Supp. at 1431. The failure of AOL to
effectively monitor their Islamic chat rooms more likely
stems from the "bottom line" rather than deliberate religious
discrimination.
308
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 541 (explaining Plaintiff's
contention that AOL violated Title II due to discriminatory
treatment based on his Islamic beliefs).
309
See discussion of hate speech and "fighting words"
supra Part I.C.1. (describing the boundaries the First Amendment places on the federal government authority to regulate
a citizen's rights of free expression).
310
Cf47 U.S.C. §230(b) (3) (2000) (encouraging the private development of Internet content monitoring technologies).
311
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,

press their ideas and beliefs, however enlightened
or unseemly. 3 12 Therefore if chat rooms both fa-

cilitate and encourage free expression, why
should they not enjoy the same First Amendment
protections as any other fora of public discus31
sion? 3
1)

Chat Rooms and Hate Speech: Protected or
Unprotected Free Speech?

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,the Court recognized that not all forms of free speech are worthy
of constitutional protection from government regulation. 3 14 One could certainly put hate speech in
this category since it neither serves a valid public
function nor enlightens

the public's views. 3 15

However, the court in R.A.V. noted that some
forms of hate speech might be within a citizen's
First Amendment rights. 3 16 Therefore, lawmakers
should be cautious when crafting statutes involving content regulation as legislators may inadvertently violate the Constitution in their quest to
regulate the method in which citizens express
their views.

3 17

Recognizing this principle, one could argue
that censoring hate speech within chat rooms
could be a form of impermissible content regula515 (1939) ("Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest,
they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and ... have been used for.., discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.").
312
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92
(1992). Mr. Noah's Title II claim could be analogized to the
St. Paul statute at issue in RA.V., which banned all speech
dealing with racial discrimination. See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d
at 535, 541.
313 Cf RA.V., 505 U.S. at 391-92; see also Hague, 307 U.S.

at 515. Both chat rooms and public streets comprise "arenas"
where people debate current issues.
314
See 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (discussing how fighting words, "those which by their very utterance inflict injury
of tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not
constitutionally protected).
315
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 540 (E.D.Va. 2003) ("To be
sure, the offensive statements plaintiff complains of are a far
cry from the 'diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development and myriad avenues for intellectual activity' that §230 is intended to protect.") (citation
omitted).
316
R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 391 (discussing when "fighting
words" ordinances are not permissible).
317
See id. (concluding that speech-banning laws should
protect against the mode of the expression rather than the
speech's content).
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tion.3 18 Specifically, if the "hate speech" postings
in Noah's AOL chat rooms do not implicate an
"immediate" threat of harm, can they be validly
erased through court enforcement of Federal
Civil Rights laws? 319 The messages in question certainly used threatening language to all of the chat
room's participants.3 2 But could AOL's Muslim
members reasonably consider the postings an "immediate threat" to their safety? 321 After all,
messages posted in chat rooms are usually anonymous (absent a descriptive user ID), do not indicate a member's location, and can be written
from anywhere and at anytime in the world.3 2 2 Although the postings constitute a particularly distasteful ideal (i.e., religious defamation), this does
not appear to fit into the Chaplinsky mold of unprotected "group fighting words. ' 3 23 The
messages did not appear to threaten any particular person or indicate an immediate possibility of
violence because they came from an anonymous
poster who did not pose a significant threat to
one particular member.3 24 Absent this "fighting
words" exception, it would seem inappropriate to
force AOL to censor these protected forms of
32 5
speech through the Civil Rights Act.
Not all forms of chat room speech will necessa-

rily receive the requisite First Amendment protection. 3 26 For example, federal or state laws may regulate certain forms of Internet harassment if they
threatened the immediate safety of a particular
group or person. 327 In addition, unprotected free
speech (e.g., posting images of child pornography)
is still not subject to any First Amendment protections, even in chat rooms. 328 Nevertheless, courts
should walk a fine line before pernitting Title II
to become a backdoor for the censorship of pro329
tected speech in chat rooms.

318 Compare St. Paul ordinance in RAV, 505 U.S. at 391
and Mr. Noah's argument that AOL should have censored
the discriminatory chat room hate speech, Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 535. See generally Siegel, supra note 145 (discussing the legal history of hate speech on the Internet and how
the United States and other world governments balance out
free speech concerns).
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535 (describing the offen319
sive chat room postings at issue); see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 571-72 (discussing when the state has a legitimate state interest in banning "fighting words.").
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535. The messages all
320
made disparaging remarks about Muslim culture, practices,
and its leading theological figures. Id.
See id. The messages only made "general" threats
321
against Muslims and were not directed at any specific chat
room member.
Id. at 534 (describing the nature of chat rooms and
322
providing a technical overview). One of the more remarkable features of the Internet is the ability for people to communicate anonymously. See generally, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S
844. at 849-853 (1997).
Compare Noah's chat room postings, Noah, 261 F.
323
Supp.2d at 535 with the discussion of appropriate "fighting
words" ordinances as laid out in Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 57172 (describing a valid State interest in curbing "immediate
threats" of violence).
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534-35. Because AOL's
324
chat rooms allow anonymous User IDs and lack geographic
location devices, none of the board posters could determine
the exact location of the other chat room members or their

names/identities.
Compare Noah's chat room postings, Noah, 261 F.
325
Supp.2d at 535 with Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. Because
the AOL chat room postings lacked Chaplinksky-like "fighting
words," there does not appear to be a basis for sidestepping
the First Amendment.
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (discussing how li326
bel, obscene statements, and "fighting words" do not carry
any First Amendment protections).
See 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(5), (c) (1) (2000) (stating that
327
the CDA does not immunize against Federal anti-harassment
laws).
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) (dis328
cussing how the First Amendment does not apply to child
pornography cases); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
764 (1982) (holding that child pornography images do not
have First Amendment protections).
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 337, 391-92
329
(1992).
515 U.S. 557 (1995). See also Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at
330
545 n. 12 (E.D. Va. 2003).

2)

Title II Chat Room Oversight and Hurley: A
Possible Form of Government-Sponsored Content
Regulation?

One can analogize the facts in Noah to a similar
situation in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Group of Boston.3 30 If the Supreme
Court did not allow a broad Massachusetts public
accommodation law to indirectly influence a private party's speaker rights, 3 3 1 it follows that courts
cannot force an ISP to remove protected hate
speech messages via Title 11.332 Enforcing the Civil
Rights Act this way appears to turn the anti-discrimination law into an unconstitutional form of

31

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.

See id. at 572-73. The imposition of Mr. Noah's Title
II censorship duty on AOL could be analogized to the imposition of the Massachusetts public accommodation law on
Hurley's St. Patrick's Day Parade Committee. See Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 545 n. 12 ("Finally, construing Title 11 as plaintiff
requests, to require that AOL censor or limit the speech of its
members, may well cause the statute to run afoul of the First
Amendment.").
332
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content regulation. 3 31 While Title II certainly
aimed at preventing discriminatory access to public facilities, its purpose was not to control the expression of people's ideas.3 34 Thus, forcing ISPs
to monitor their chat rooms for potentially discriminatory messages seems like an indirect form
335
of government-sponsored censorship.
This interpretation in no way destroys the effectiveness of either Hurley's state law or Title 11.336
As Hurley noted, the private party could not deny
access to the participants simply because of their
sexual orientation. 337 This probably extends to
ISPs like AOL, who could not deny plaintiffs like
Mr. Noah access to their chat rooms solely based
on a member's religious faith. 338 However, both
the Massachusetts law and Title II cannot serve as
a form of content regulation by forcing private
parties to "tailor" their forums into a more acceptable message."3 9
Expanding this point, enforcing Title II in the
chat room environment may quash the Internet's
overall purpose, or worse, contribute to their possible demise.3 40 People would probably not express their views so freely in this electronic forum
if they knew ISPs would subsequently edit
them.3 4 ' However, monitoring chat rooms for
hate speech does not entirely depend on federal

oversight. 342 ISPs, unlike the government, can still

333 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73. Literal compliance with
Title 1I's anti-discrimination provisions in this suggested
manner would require AOL to screen out potentially divisive
postings to ensure an "open access" and "content neutral"
environment.
334 See discussion of Congress's intent when passing Title
II supra Part I.A.
335 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73; Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at
545 n. 12. By forcing AOL, via Title II, to screen out hate
speech postings in its chat rooms, the ISP would appear to
become the Federal Government's de facto "agent."
336
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. The policies behind the
Noah and Hurley decisions do not endorse the idea of allowing AOL or the Boston Committee permission to deny
Muslim/gay people access to the chat room/parade. See
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535-36, 540-45.
337
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572 ("Its enforcement does not
address any dispute about the participation of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals to various units admitted to the
parade .... Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission
of GLIB unit carrying its own banner...").
338
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535-36 (E.D. Va. 2003).
Mr. Noah never conclusively established that AOL denied
him access to their chat rooms because he was Muslim. In
fact, he terminated his account on his own accord. Id. But see
discussion infra Part III.D (posing the question as to whether
ISPs could use the "physicality" or CDA defense in bypassing
Title II's "equal access" provisions).
339 Imposing the laws by requiring censorship duties on
the defendants in Noah and Hurley would effectively control

the speech content of their forums. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at

censor messages on their own accord since they
are not state actors. 3 43 However, forcing them to
censor via a federal law raises a different issue altogether, and brings into question whether courts
3 44
are interpreting Congress's intent correctly. .

As stated earlier, Congress in Title II wanted "to
remove the daily affront and humiliation involved
in discriminatory denials of access to [public] facilities." 345 Reading the statute plainly does not
imply a mandate to make public facilities "content
neutral." 34 6 Indeed, interpreting it this way would

frustrate the aims of the CDA, Hurley, and Reno by
discriminating against one form of content for another. 34 7 A better solution would be adopting the
CDA's methodology and giving ISPs room to invent their own efficient solutions in solving the
348
problem.
D.

Can Title II Ever Apply to the Internet Chat
Room Environment?

The question remains as to whether ISPs can
ever utilize Title II's "physicality" requirement, the
CDA, or the First Amendment to avoid every discrimination lawsuit dealing with their chat
rooms. 349 For example, could ISPs use the same

572-73.
340

See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th

Cir. 1997) ("Thus... liability upon notice has a chilling effect

on the freedom of Internet speech."); see also Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 540.
341
342

See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.

343

See id. at 445; see also Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 546 (dis-

See Cyber Promotions Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 436 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (holding that private ISP did
not violate a plaintiffs free speech rights by restricting their
e-mails).
missing Mr. Noah's First Amendment claim because AOL is a
private party).
344 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571-72 (denying the use of state
power to interfere with "speaker's autonomy to choose the
content of his own message").
345 Daniel v.Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1964)).
346 See 42 U.S.C. §2000a(a) (2000).
347 See discussion of CDA, Hurley, and Reno supra Part
III.B-C (emphasizing First Amendment concerns when rationalizing their holdings).
348 See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("Another important purpose of §230 was to encourage [ISPs] to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive
material over their services"); see also 42 U.S.C. §2000(b) (3)
(2000).
'49
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 539 (arguing that the
CDA provides ISPs immunity from federal civil rights claims

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

defenses in denying a racial/religious minority access or admission to its chat rooms? While this
possibility seems remote due to the non-selectivity
and relative anonymity with the chat room registration process, 350 an ISP could theoretically avert
a Tide II access lawsuit simply by claiming that "virtual" forums are not subject to the statute's provi35
sions. '
Access Now suggests that Congress could avert
this possibility by including Internet mediums,
like chat rooms, within the statutory definition of
"places of public accommodation" in both the
ADA 352 and Title .353 However, a simple amendment of Title II's language will likely neither resolve the free speech issues addressed in RAVand
Hurley nor bypass the CDA publisher immunity in
non-access cases like Mr. Noah's. 3

54

Nevertheless,

some limited situations may exist where a chat
room plaintiff could utilize the "new" Title II's
anti-discrimination provisions while still respecting the CDA and the First Amendment.
For example, court interpretation of this expanded Title II could limit Internet applicability
solely to cases where plaintiffs proved a discriminatory denial of access.35 5 Instead of focusing on
over a chat room's third party postings). The court does not
address whether the CDA could be used to escape Title II
suits that address ISP behavior rather than the actions of the
ISP's individual members.
See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the open nature of
350
the chat room/Internet medium).
351
Under this theoretical suit, the defendant ISP could
argue it was not subject to Title II because Internet chat
rooms are not "physical" facilities. See discussion supra Part
III.A.1 (describing Title II's physicality requirement and the
majority of court decisions approving such an interpretation).
See Access Now Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F.
352
Supp.2d 1312, 1318 (S.D.Fla. 2002) (arguing that Congress
has the sole power in revising the ADA language to include
the Internet as a "place of public accommodation").
353
Hudson, supra note 16 (quoting Robert O'Neil, Director of Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression, "A legislature could repackage places of public
accommodation to include online places if they choose.").
354
Even if Mr.Noah could link a chat room to a "public
place of accommodation," he would still have to prove that
AOL denied him equal access to the chat room and that forcing AOL to censor the third party messages does not constitute an unconstitutional form of content regulation. See discussion of "discriminatory intent" and the First Amendment
conflicts with content regulation supra Parts III.B, III.C.
355
See 42 U.S.C. §2000a(a) (2000) (describing Congressional intent in providing "equal access" to all persons in the
"full and equal enjoyment of goods, services .

. . .");

see also

Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (holding that a lakeside
recreational park could not deny African-African residents of
Little Rock, Arkansas access to their facilities), and Miller v.
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the chat room's third party postings or any ISP
duty to edit their content,3 5 6 the amended law
should only apply to cases where ISPs arbitrarily
denied a protected class admission or registration.3 5 7 In this regard, the CDA and the First

Amendment will likely not be an issue, as the
complaint deals with ISP discriminatory conduct
rather than chat room message content.35s By limiting Tide II chat room enforcement as such, courts
will likely be able to "remove the daily affront and
humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of
access" 359 and still protect ISPs from burdensome
censorship duties.
However, even this amended Tide II example
could face additional conflicts. The present Tide
II law still grants a "private club" exception that
excludes federal liability for non-public "places of
accommodation.

' 360

The line between public and

private areas appears blurry in the Internet, as
many privatewebmasters depend on public ISP networks to maintain their website's accessibility to
the outside world. 361 Will the ISP bear the liability
burden if a private webmaster denies racial/religious minorities access to their private chat room
just because the ISP hosts their private website?
Amusement Enterprises Inc, 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
These cases dealt with a facility operator denying a Title II
protected class access to their public facilities.
356
See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, 261 F. Supp.2d 532,
535-36, 541 (E.D. Va. 2003). Although Mr. Noah claims he
received "disparate discriminatory treatment" by AOL, the
crux of his argument centers on AOL's alleged refusal to remove the discriminatory third party messages from the ISP's
chat rooms. See id.
357 See id. at 537. The court found AOL to be an improper defendant in Mr. Noah's lawsuit because his complaint made "no reference whatever ...

to any acts or con-

duct by AOL Time Warner alleged to be violative of any legal
duty owed to the plaintiff." By focusing on chat room access
issues, a proper Title II claim would center on the actions
undertaken by the ISP (they largely control admission to
their forums) and not a third party. See id.
Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992);
358
Zeran v. Am. Online Inc, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). In
this hypothetical, the lawsuit does not deal with R.A.V 's government-sponsored content regulation or any form of bulletin board censorship as seen in Zeran.
Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88-95
914, at 18 (1964)).
360 42 U.S.C. §2000a(e); see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
Boy Scouts is not a "place of public accommodation" because
it is a private organization).
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850-53 (1997)
361
(describing the makeup on the Internet, specifically its network/server relationship and how customers utilize ISPs to
host their websites).
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This public/private dilemma seems remarkably
similar to the "publisher/distributor" discussion
last seen in the CDA-related case law.3 62 An ISP
could argue that they should not bear Title II responsibility over private chat rooms, since they
have no ability to control their customers' private
actions. " "-' Like the defendant in Blumenthal v.
Drudge,"6 4 the hypothetical ISP simply provides
web space and does not have any direct involvement with the discrimination in question. 36 5 Indeed, forcing ISPs to monitor private websites
would run into the same conflicts present in public chat rooms: the CDA's ISP "publisher" immunity and the First Amendment barrier to content

IV.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CHAT
ROOM MONITORING

In summation, an amended Title II (which included chat rooms) would still need to consider
the broader implications of expanding applicability to the Internet. Congress might instead hold
off and pass a more specific Internet anti-discrimination law, which limits itself to accessibility concerns and fleshes out the private/public overlap
within the Internet's network structure.3 68 In any
case, a thorough debate for either expanding old
or creating new legislation probably assists courts
in preventing potential loopholes that a rushed
Title II amendment likely produces.

Removing Title II jurisdiction from Internet
chat rooms will not necessarily turn it into a "haven for hate speech."3' 6 9 Indeed, the private sector still has a number of potential solutions available that are free from Noah's government-sponsored constraints. In this regard, one wonders
whether ISPs are using the CDA and First Amendment protections to avoid any responsibility in
ameliorating the often uncontrolled and rowdy
nature of chat room discussion. After all, AOL
could have easily avoided Mr. Noah's lawsuit by
removing the discriminatory messages after receiving his alleged e-mail complaints.
Recent developments seem to suggest a more
proactive stance, as major ISPs like MSN have
closed their previously open Internet chat rooms
to the general public. 3 70 While this adds to Zeran
and Noah's fears of these forums' eventual closure, 3 71 it could be a positive step in that ISPs can
more effectively manage their chat rooms for content and taste. Plaintiffs like Mr. Noah may best
be served by these changes, as they would not
have to depend on Title II for a more pleasant
3 72
Internet experience.
Of course, time might be the ultimate judge in
controlling chat room conversation. Eventually,

362
See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (explaining the publisher/distributor issues involved when ISPs
provide chat room services to their members).
363 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C.
1998) (holding that an ISP was not liable for hosting a website that allegedly posted defamatory remarks of White House
employees).
364
992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
365
See id. at 50. This fact pattern is similar to the one in
Blumenthal where AOL was sued for hosting the Drudge Report, which allegedly posted libelous claims about several
White House aides in the Clinton Administration. The D.C.
District Court noted that AOL had no "substantive or editorial involvement" in Mr. Drudge's website articles and was
.nothing more than a provider of an interactive computer
service on which the Drudge Report was carried." Id.
366
See id. at 51-52 (describing how the CDA grants the
ISP immunity for the content originating from its members
and not itself); see also supra Part III.C (discussing the unconstitutional practice of content regulation of speech).
367
See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51 (quoting Zeran v.
Am. Online Inc, 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997) ("None
of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who
posts defamatory messages would escape accountability").
However, the hypothetical plaintiff would still have to prove
that the private website was a "place of public accommodation," see Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276

(7th Cir. 1993).
368
Besides the CDA, the government has protected the
Internet from federal/state oversight in other areas. For example, Congress in 1998 passed the Internet Tax Freedom
Act, 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000) (later extended in 2001), which
prevented states from collecting federal, state, and local taxes
on Internet access or discriminatory e-commerce taxes for a
three-year period. Currently, Congress is debating whether
to extend the moratorium for another period. Carl Hulse,
Senate Extends Until 2007 Ban on Internet Taxes, N.Y. TIMEs,
April 30, 2004, at A17.
369
But see Siegel, supra note 145 (arguing that hate
speech remains alive and well in internet sites throughout
the world).
370
Laurie J. Flynn, Microsoft's Rivals Won't Shut Chat
Rooms, N.Y.TMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at C5 (detailing MSN's
plans to limit ISP's chat rooms to subscribers only, but pointing out that MSN's competitors, such as Yahoo! and AOL
have no plans to limit their website chat rooms to non-paying
customers).
371
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see also Noah v. AOL Time
Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 532, 540 (E.D.Va. 2003).
372
See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534. It would be a lot
simpler if Mr. Noah relies on AOL, rather than the government, to provide a better chat room environment since private parties have more flexibility in monitoring on their own
accord.

regulation. 3 66 Of course, the hypothetical plaintiff

would still be free to sue the private website
solely.

3 67
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technology and the financial burden might improve so that Congress may feel justified in repealing the CDA. In addition, ISPs may not have the
same "distributor" immunity and be forced to remove indecent messages of which they have rea-
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sonable notice. Of course, this may never happen
so courts should be cautious before attempting to
extend traditional federal regulation into the
cyberspace medium.

